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Text Analysis in Adversarial Seings: Does Deception Leave a Stylistic Trace?
TOMMI GRO¨NDAHL and N. ASOKAN
Textual deception constitutes a major problem for online security. Many studies have argued that deceptiveness leaves traces in
writing style, which could be detected using text classification techniques. By conducting an extensive literature review of existing
empirical work, we demonstrate that while certain linguistic features have been indicative of deception in certain corpora, they
fail to generalize across divergent semantic domains. We suggest that deceptiveness as such leaves no content-invariant stylistic
trace, and textual similarity measures provide superior means of classifying texts as potentially deceptive. Additionally, we discuss
forms of deception beyond semantic content, focusing on hiding author identity by writing style obfuscation. Surveying the literature
on both author identification and obfuscation techniques, we conclude that current style transformation methods fail to achieve
reliable obfuscation while simultaneously ensuring semantic faithfulness to the original text. We propose that future work in style
transformation should pay particular aention to disallowing semantically drastic changes.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deception is rampant in online text, and its detection constitutes a major challenge at the crossroads of natural lan-
guage processing (NLP) and information security research. Multiple studies have contended that leading machine
learning techniques are able to extract features that can distinguish between deceptive and normal text. In order for
such features to truly reflect deceptiveness instead of domain-specific lexical content, the features discovered should
generalize across domains. Variants of deception also extend beyond textual content. In particular, metalinguistic in-
formation can be obfuscated to deceive a classifier while retaining the original content. Of such endeavours, the most
prominently discussed has been adversarial stylometry [14, 15], consisting of techniques that aempt to provide author
anonymity by defeating identification or profiling. In this survey we review prior research on textual deception and
its detection, focusing on deceptive content in Section 2 and adversarial stylometry in Section 3.
Modern NLP techniques offer a large variety of methods for classifying texts based on the distribution of linguistic
information: features that are detectable from text alone, without extra-linguistic knowledge concerning author behav-
ior, metadata etc. Depending on the task, target categories can be delineated by semantic content, grammar, or any
combination of these. Identifying or profiling authors based on writing style comprises the field of stylometry. As a
scientific endeavour it dates back at least to the 19th century [104, 112], and was formulated as a computational task
in the 1960s [118, 163]. In contemporary work, the traditional focus on literary documents has largely been overshad-
owed by the increased use of online datasets, such as blog posts [121], e-mails [32, 37], forum discussions [183], SMS
messages [138], and tweets [25]. Neal et al. [123] comprehensively survey the state-of-the-art in stylometry.
Stylometry uses linguistic information to extract a non-linguistic property of the author of a text, such as identity,
gender or age. Within NLP, it thus belongs to the field of metaknowledge extraction [33], which relies on linguistic
information systematically correlating with the relevant property under investigation, despite that property itself not
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being linguistic. e conjecture that author identity can be reliably inferred from his/her stylistic “fingerprint” is
known as the Human Stylome Hypothesis (HSH) [168].
Motivated by the HSH, we can also formulate an analogous question about any other property of a text: does the
property leave a linguistic trace, and if so, to what extent does it leave a content-independent stylistic trace that could be
recognized across semantically distant texts? In this paper we discuss this question with respect to a class of properties
that fall under the umbrella term of deception. We investigate the issue both from the perspective of detecting deception
in text, and from the adversarial perspective of creating deceptive data that can evade classification. Our focus is on
information security applications in particular. Terminologically, we call non-deceptive text “normal”.
If reliable linguistic cues of deception existed, they could be used to detect security breaches such as fake reviews [98,
128, 129, 177, 179], troll-messages [23, 115, 153], or even fake news [126, 132]. A number of prior studies have aempted
to demonstrate the potential of stylometry for deception detection, and to find the major linguistic determinants of
deceptive text. We review and discuss this research in Section 2. A common assumption behind all these studies is that
deception leaves a stylistic trace comparable to an author’s “stylome”. If true, this would allow detecting deceptiveness
from the text alone, without recourse to extra-linguistic information. If, on the other hand, deception leaves no major
stylistic trace, its reliable detection would require linguistic analyses to be augmented with other techniques. Based on
the survey, we argue for the laer position, and suggest alternative methods based on content-comparison that provide
more promising approaches for this task (Section 2.3).
In Section 3 we turn to adversarial stylometry. From a security perspective, it simultaneously functions as an aack
against authorship classification, and as a defence against non-consensual deanonymization or profiling. e laer
scenario has been called the deanonymization aack [121], and its feasibility is conditional on the HSH. erefore a
major question is whether current author identification techniques pose a realistic privacy threat. Based on a review
of state-of-the-art stylometry research in Section 3.1, we argue that while the HSH has not always been validated,
the deanonymization aack constitutes a genuine privacy concern especially when the candidate authors are few in
number. In Section 3.2 we discuss the aack scenario in more detail.
Methods for style transformation can be divided into manual, computer-assisted and automatic techniques. For
ordinary users, only the last would constitute a practically effective mitigation against the deanonymization aack.
Manual obfuscation is difficult and time-consuming, and requires a good grasp of linguistic subtleties, whichmakes the
task unsuitable for users lacking extra time and resources. An additional difference can be made between obfuscation
and imitation, where the laer targets a particular style instead of simply avoiding detection. Section 3.3 reviews
existing work on style obfuscation and imitation techniques. We argue that while some methods show potential in
principle, all face serious problems with balancing between obfuscation and maintaining semantic content.
Given that style obfuscation and imitation constitute types of deception, we then return to the original question
of whether deception leaves a stylistic trace, and apply it to this special case. Even if obfuscation was successful,
the property of being obfuscated could itself be stylometrically traceable. Problematically, our review in Section 3.3.3
demonstrates that this question has typically not been tested. Studies aempting such “fingerprinting” of the obfusca-
tion method have succeeded [22, 36], but have only experimented on a small subset of possible methods. As different
techniques require different recognition methods, a general detector of style obfuscation is likely difficult to aain.
In summary, this survey addresses three major questions:
Q1 Does deception leave a content-independent stylistic trace?
Q2 Is the deanonymization aack a realistic privacy concern?
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Q3 Can the deanonymization aack be mitigated with automatic style obfuscation?
Q1 provides the common theme of the survey. Section 2 discusses the linguistic detection of deceptive content, with
a particular focus on online text. Section 3 then moves on to the topic of adversarial stylometry, i.e. mitigating the
deanonymization aack (Q2) via style transformation (Q3).
We summarize our findings and suggestions below.
• ere is no evidence that deception leaves a content-invariant stylistic trace. Instead, detection should involve
the comparison of semantic content across texts.
• While the validity of the HSH is uncertain, the deanonymization aack is a realistic privacy concern.
• As of yet, automatic style transformation techniques do not secure semantic faithfulness.
2 DECEPTION DETECTION VIA TEXT ANALYSIS
In this section we review the research on textual deception detection, and discuss the linguistic features associated
with writing intended to deceive the reader. Multiple studies have indicated that at least non-expert human accuracy
in detecting textual deception is approximately on a chance level, or even worse [13, 46, 47, 124]. As Fitzpatrick et al.
[52] note, this makes deception detection a somewhat exceptional topic for NLP, since human performance in most
other text classification problems tends to be more accurate than computational solutions. In contrast, automated
classification of deceptive text should increase not only the efficiency but also the accuracy of human performance.
However, we argue that the divergence of features deemed relevant by different studies indicates that classification
has been too content-specific to generalize across semantic domains. Relevant features tend to be lexical correlates of
deceptive text in particular corpora rather than general “deception markers” as such.
Most research in deception detection has concerned face-to-face discussion [39, 44, 46, 47, 51, 52]. As Crabb [32]
notes, such results do not always directly apply to communication via electronic devices, which are the most relevant
for information security concerns. In particular, physiological data is unavailable to the receiver in text-based commu-
nication. We limit our discussion to deceptive communication in wrien English. Following DePaulo et al. [39], we
dissociate deceptiveness as a communicative intention from falsity as a semantic property.1 Utilizing a famous formula-
tion by Paul Grice, communication can roughly be characterized as behavior with the deliberate goal of causing certain
thoughts in the (intended) receiver [60, 162]. Deception thus constitutes a specific type of communication, where the
speaker intends the hearer to form thoughts which the speaker believes to be false. e notion of deception as an
author intention is also shared by Buller and Burgoon’s Interpersonal Deception eory [17]. For our purposes, we can
use the following general characterization:
Deception
A deceives B if for some proposition P:
A believes that P is false
A aempts to make B believe that P is true
e deceptiveness of a communicative act makes no restrictions on the nature of the proposition P. In particular,
P might not belong to the semantic content of the expression E. We can thus separate between explicit and implicit
deception as follows:
1 Literal truths with a deceptive intention include cases where the speaker believes the hearer to infer a falsity from a literal truth. If Bob asks: “Where
is Jim?”, and Alice answers: “I saw him in the cafeteria”, in normal circumstances Alice assumes Bob to infer that Jim may still be there. Hence, if Alice
believes Jim not to be there anymore (e.g. she also saw him leave the cafeteria), she is deceiving Bob by telling a literal truth. Assumed inferences can
be understood as belonging to communicated content as implicatures [162].
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Explicit deception
A explicitly deceives B if for some proposition P:
A believes that P is false
A aempts to make B believe that P is true by uering an expression E
e semantic content of E contains P
Implicit deception
A implicitly deceives B if for some proposition P:
A believes that P is false
A aempts to make B believe that P is true by uering an expression E
e semantic content of E does not contain P
A assumes B to infer P from the explicit content of E and context information that A assumes B to know
In both cases, B infers P from A’s uerance E. In explicit deception, P can be found directly from E itself without
consulting other assumptions or beliefs within the discourse. In implicit deception, further inferences are needed
to come to the conclusion P. As an example, consider fake online reviews, which Section 2.2.1 will discuss in detail.
Some fake reviews contain explicit falsities: if a TripAdvisor user claims to have been in a hotel and (dis)liked it, this
is explicitly deceptive if he actually has not visited the hotel. However, suppose the reviewer merely makes general
claims about the hotel (“is hotel is excellent/horrible!” etc.). Here, the deception concerns the reviewer’s first-hand
experience, which he lacks, and is independent of the reviewer’s actual beliefs of his review’s correctness. erefore,
it can be treated as a variant of implicit deception.
We further divide different types of deception reviewed in Sections 2.1–2.2 to the following three groups, the first
being explicit and the two laer implicit:
Deception of literal content: the semantic content of the text is deceptive
Deception of authority: the deceiver implies having authority concerning the issue, which he lacks
Deception of intention: the deceiver has an ulterior deceptive motive for writing the message
While not meant to be exhaustive, this taxonomy is useful in accounting for disparities between different studies.
Most studies reviewed concern deception of literal content. However, as argued above, fake reviews can exhibit de-
ception of authority instead. Deception of intention is exemplified by trolling, where the author writes something to
advance a particular view or to harass another person. Here, deception does not necessarily concern the literal content
(which may sometimes be sincerely believed by the troll), but instead the ulterior motive behind the message.
Ultimately, the issue at hand is whether it would be possible to develop a “textual lie detector” that takes a text as an
input and outputs a classification label that reliably tracks the real-world property of deceptiveness. e main problem
for such a goal is that even if deceptive texts differ from non-deceptive texts in particular corpora, the features may
not generalize across different text types. Deception could leave some stylistic cues in e.g. in online discussions, fake
news, fake reviews, or scientific papers; but in order for the hypothetical “lie detector” to work, these cues should be
sufficiently similar across them all. To evaluate whether existing methods are applicable for such general deception
detection, we need to compare empirical results from different studies and see if common paerns emerge.
Table 1 shows the linguistic properties that appear three or more times in the studies reviewed in Sections 2.1-2.2.
Based on these, we formulate the following hypotheses:
H1: deceptive text is emotionally laden
H2: deceptive text contains certainty-related terminology
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Studies Cue
[19, 64, 80, 98, 124, 128, 129, 184, 185] High emotional load
[19, 64, 100, 128, 129, 177, 184] Generality / abstractness / lack of specificity
[95, 98, 100, 128, 179] High use of first-person pronouns
[63, 80, 113, 124] Low use of first-person pronouns
[32, 128, 129, 186] High use of verbs
[64, 95, 113] High use of certainty-related words
Table 1. The most common linguistic cues to deception from all studies reviewed in Sections 2.1-2.2
H3: deceptive text lacks in detail
H4: deceptive text lacks a first-person narrative
Table 1 contains two contradictory properties: high and low use of first person pronouns. We choose the low use
hypothesis as the default (H4), since it would be predicted by the lack of first-hand experience of the situation. is
empirical divergence is indicative of the context-dependency of suggested deception cues. Nevertheless, H1–H4 are
intuitively understandable and fit well within standard psychological models of deception [17]. H1 can be explained
either by the stress caused by lying [45], or from aempted emotional persuasion of the audience. Experimental
results reviewed in Section 2.2.1 point to the laer [128, 129]. H2 also likely results from the persuasive purpose of
deception. H3 and H4 are motivated by the fact that deceivers oen have no first-hand experience of the situation they
are describing.
H1–H4 can thus be argued to follow from two basic tendencies present in deception: aempted persuasion and lack
of first-hand knowledge. Interestingly, these can sometimes motivate the deceiver to behave in opposite ways, which
may partly explain our seemingly inconsistent finding concerning first-person pronoun usage. Increased use of the
first-person pronoun indicates a personal narrative and hence emphasizes the notion of the author having actually
experienced the situation under discussion. It can therefore be used in an aempt to increase the credibility of the
text. On the other hand, the lack of first-hand experience makes it more difficult for deceivers to credibly describe
something they do not know in detail, and hence can motivate them to stick to a more general, third-person narrative.
Section 2.1 reviews the literature on deception detection from a general perspective not specific to information
security concerns. Section 2.2 focuses specifically on deception in online text, discussing fake reviews (2.2.1) and troll
comments (2.2.2). We summarize our analyses and give recommendations for future research in Section 2.3.
2.1 General deception detection
In this section we focus on deception detection outside of online text datasets. We further distinguish between experi-
mentally elicited deception and natural or non-elicited deception, devoting Section 2.1.1 to the former and Section 2.1.2
to the laer.
2.1.1 Experimentally elicited deception. In this section we present results from experimental research on elicited
deceptive text. By elicited we mean that the texts were produced at the command of a test instructor, and that their
deceptiveness or truthfulness was explicitly requested.
Burgoon et al. [19] formulated eight hypotheses concerning deception:
“deceptive senders display higher
(a) quantity,
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(b) non-immediacy,
(c) expressiveness,
(d) informality, and
(e) affect;
and less
(f) complexity,
(g) diversity, and
(h) specificity of language” [19]2
ey based these hypotheses on two experiments, where truthful and deceptive text was gathered from participants.
e messages were obtained via e-mail in the first experiment, and via either face-to-face communication or text chat
in the second experiment. However, the results of these experiments were contradictory, as deceivers used longer but
less complex messages in the first test, and shorter but more complex messages in the second (although the results
from the second test were not statistically significant). e hypotheses (a–h) reflect the results of the first experiment.
In relation to H1–H4, (e) indicates emotional load (H1) and (f–h) fall into the broader category of lacking detail (H3).
However, the laer is partly at odds with (c), which indicates that deceivers also use higher amounts of descriptive
words. is effect could arise from the aempted persuasion involved in deception.
Based on nine linguistic properties similar to those suggested by Burgoon et al. [19] (each composed of many
features, 27 altogether), Zhou et al. [184] classified experimentally elicited texts as deceptive or truthful. All features
were relevant with the exception of specificity. In a subsequent study, Zhou et al. [185] report 22 linguistic features
as indicative of deception (see Table 2). Using these features, they compared four machine learning methods in the
classification task: discriminant analysis, decision trees, neural networks and logistic regression. e methods fared
roughly equally well, and at best achieved an accuracy of ca. 80%.
Newman et al.’s [124] results on classifying experimentally elicited deceptive and truthful texts indicated that de-
ception was characterized by the reduced use of first- and third-person pronouns and exclusive words (e.g. but, except),
along with the increased use of negative emotion words (e.g. hate, anger) and motion words (e.g. walk, go). ese find-
ings are partly in line with more general observations concerning deception, but not fully. While emotional load (H1)
and reduced first-person pronoun use (H4) are expected , it is unclear why deception should correlate with the reduc-
tion of both first- and third-person pronouns, a decrease in exclusive words, or an increase in motion words. Typically,
first- and third-person pronoun usage can be seen as complementary ways to talk about a situation, the first-person
indicating a personal narrative and the third-person an impersonal one. It is therefore unclear what properties the
reduction in both would coincide with. Also, exclusion words are likely too abstract to be closely related to particular
communicative functions, and hence it would be surprising if their prevalence in deceptive text were to generalize
across different datasets. Finally, motion words generally denote concrete events, and therefore contradict the general
finding of deception lacking in detail (H3). It is therefore relatively unsurprising that, aside of reduced first-person
pronoun use and emotional load, Newman et al.’s [124] results do not resurface in other studies.
Based on a review of prior research, Hancock et al. [63] formulated seven hypotheses on linguistic deception cues:
“(a) Liars will produce more words during deceptive conversations than during truthful conversations.
2antity means the amount of text produced, non-immediacy refers to the lack of directness and intensity between the author and receiver, expressive-
ness is the amount of descriptive material in the text (e.g. adjectives and adverbs), informality is indicated e.g. by the amount of typos, affect refers to
the emotional load of the text, complexity is measured by readability indices [160], diversity is the type-token ratio among words, and specificity denotes
the level of detail in the text.
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(b) Liars will ask more questions during deceptive conversations as compared to truthful conversations.
(c) Liars will use fewer first-person singular but more other-directed pronouns in deceptive conversations than
in truthful conversations.
(d) Liars will use more negative emotion words during deceptive conversations than during truthful conversa-
tions.
(e) Liars will use fewer exclusive words and negation terms during deceptive conversations as compared to truth-
ful conversations.
(f) Liars will avoid causation phrases during deceptive interactions relative to truthful interactions.
(g) Liars will use more sense terms during deceptive interactions as compared to truthful interactions.” [63]
e test subjects were divided between motivated and unmotivated liars based on whether the experimenter had
provided false information (later revoked) about the importance of the ability to lie for success in life. Some hypothe-
ses received confirmation from all liars (a–c, g), some only from motivated liars (f), and others from neither (d, e).
Hypothesis (c) is indicative of a more general property of deception: the lack of a personal narrative (H4). However, a
contrasting result is provided by the confirmation of (g): the increase of sense-related terminology. Sensation indicates
a personal narrative, making this result contrast with the more general finding that deception tends to correlate with
the lack of first-hand knowledge and detail (H3).
Lee et al. [95] tested the ability of various linguistic features to predict deception in data from 30 deceptive and
30 truthful participants answering questions. While their initial hypothesis contained eight conglomerate properties,
only one was statistically significant: certainty, as calculated with a five-feature proxy measure comprised of causation
words (e.g. because, hence), insight words (e.g. think, know), certainty words (e.g. always, never), first-person singular
pronouns, present-tense verbs, and tenacity verbs (e.g. is, has). All five predicted deception in a statistically significant
manner. ese results are partly contradictory with Hancock et al’s [63], who found that (motivated) liars tended to
avoid causation phrases. Further, the increase of first-person pronouns contrasts with many other studies, where their
high use has correlated negatively with deception (H4).
Mihalcea and Strapparava [113] classified truthful and deceptive opinions concerning political and personal issues
(abortion, capital punishment, and the responder’s best friend) gathered via Amazon Mechanical Turk. At best they
achieved a 70% accuracy with a Naı¨ve Bayes classifier. ey report a decrease of self-related words and an increase of
certainty-related words as indicative of deception. Both results are in line with general findings of deception typically
instantiating aempted persuasion (H1–H2) and a lack of first-hand experience (H3–H4).
In summary, the studies reviewed in this section suggest certain common features of experimentally elicited de-
ception, but also include some unclear and even contradictory results. e results are collected in Table 2. e table
additionally shows which of the hypotheses H1–H4 receive support or are contradicted by the findings. A general
trend is visible: deceivers oen try to artificially emphasize what they say by using emotional and certainty-related
terminology (H1–H2), while not providing detailed information about the topic they address (H3). However, contra-
dictory results exist especially with respect to features related to the first-person narrative (H4). Many studies also
support some of the hypotheses but oppose others. For instance, in Hancock et al.’s [63] data deception correlated both
with reduced first-person pronoun usage and increased sense-terminology. e first of these features supports H4, but
the laer points to the opposite direction, as sense-terminology oen relates to descriptions of first-hand encounters.
A similar case is found in Newman et al. [124], who detected both reduced first-person pronoun usage and increased
motion-word usage as indicators of deception.
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Study Test setting Deception cues Support Oppose
[19]
[184]
A the-based game [19]; a vari-
ant of the Desert Survival Prob-
lem [92, 184]
quantity, reduced immediacy, expressive-
ness, informality, affect, reduced complexity,
reduced diversity, reduced specificity
H1, H3
[185] Two variants of the Desert Sur-
vival Problem [92]
verbs, modifiers, word length, punctuation,
modal verbs, individual reference, group refer-
ence, emotiveness, content diversity, redun-
dancy, perceptual information, spatiotemporal
information, errors, affect, imagery, pleasant-
ness, positive activation, positive imagery, neg-
ative activation
H1 H3
[124] Reported views about abortion,
friendship, and a mock crime
scenario.
reducedfirst personpronouns, reduced third
person pronouns, reduced exclusive words, neg-
ative emotion words, motion words
H1, H4 H4
[63] Conversations between two
participants
quantity, questions, reduced first person sin-
gular pronouns, other-directed pronouns,
sense terms
H4 H4
[95] A questioner-responder game causation words, insight words, certainty
words, first-person singular pronouns, present-
tense verbs, tenacity verbs
H2 H4
[113] Reported views about abortion,
capital punishment, and friend-
ship
reduced self-related words, certainty-
related words
H2, H4
Table 2. Linguistic cues of experimentally elicited deception
Bold: support H1–H4
Italics: do not support H1–H4
2.1.2 Non-elicited deception. We now move on to deception in texts which have not explicitly been requested to
be deceptive. ese include both real-world corpora, as well as texts produced in experimental conditions where
deceptiveness was not asked but was later evaluated based on independent criteria.
A common dataset for real-life deception has been the Enron e-mail corpus [85].3 Keila and Skillicorn [80] detected
deceptive text from the Enron corpus, using features drawn from Zhou et al. [187] and Newman et al. [124] on
the linguistic cues of deception: reduced use of first and third person pronouns and exclusive words, and increased
use of negative emotion words and motion words. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, assuming these features to always
indicate deception is not unproblematic. Further, while Keila and Skillcorn’s manual evaluation indicated that the
e-mails ranked high by these properties contained deceptive e-mails, the lack of ground truth makes it impossible to
properly evaluate their results. Keila and Skillicorn additionally note that not only deception but other “marked” types
of communication were also indicated by these features, such as otherwise inappropriate messages.
Louwerse et al. [100] predicted fraud in the Enron corpus using a five-point abstractness scale based on prior work
by Semin and Fiedler [154], who classified verbs and adjectives on the following scale, (a) being the most concrete and
(e) the most abstract (examples from Semin and Fiedler [154]):
(a) Descriptive Action Verbs: hit, yell, walk
(b) Interpretative Action Verbs: help, tease, avoid
3hp://www.cs.cmu.edu/∼enron/
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(c) State Action Verbs: surprise, amaze, anger
(d) State Verbs: trust, understand
(e) Adjectives: distraught, optimal
Louwerse et al. [100] further divided adjectives to four analogical classes based on (a)–(d). Using Semin and Fiedler’s
[154] assessment that abstractness indicates low verifiability and low informativity, they predicted that high abstract-
ness would correlate with deception. e email database was divided into sixteen events based on sending times, some
of which were highly correlatedwith deception taking place within the Enron corporation. Regression analysis demon-
strated that these events correlated with linguistic cues of high abstractness, providing support for the hypothesis.
Additionally, based on the results of Newman et al. [124] and Hancock et al. [63] (see Section 2.1.1), Louwerse et al.
[100] further investigated the correlation of deceptive events in the Enron corpus with first and third person pronouns,
causal adverbs, negation, the connective “but”, and email length. Of these, first person pronouns and negations were
partially indicative of deceptive events, but the results were contrary to the prior studies [63, 124], as first person
pronouns were used more in deceptive emails rather than less.
Larcker and Zakolyukina [93] studied linguistic properties of fraudulent and truthful financial statements by Chief
Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in conference calls. eir results diverged significantly
between CEOs and CFOs. Differences were found in e.g. negations and extremely negative emotion words, which
correlated positively with deception for CFOs but not CEOs. Some cues were even contrastive, as deception corre-
lated with certainty-related words among CFOs, but hesitation-related words among CEOs. One possible reason for
these differences could be that the features reflect the personal style of the CEOs/CFOs themselves rather than their
deceptiveness. However, some commonalities were found: deceptive CEOs and CFOs both used more general group
references, less non-extreme positive emotion terms and less third-person plural pronouns. While the prevalence of
general group references indicates distance and thus supports H4, the other indicators seem particular to this study,
as they are not replicated in other studies. ey also bear no clear relation to H1–H4.
Toma and Hancock [166] compared the linguistic properties of fraudulent and truthful online dating profiles. While
the profiles were wrien in experimental seings, deception was not encouraged, and was only detected by comparing
the profiles to ground-truth gathered about the users. Deception correlated significantly with reduced first-person
singular pronouns, increased negations, a lower word count, and a decrease in negative emotion vocabulary. While
the last feature stands in opposition to many other studies [80, 124, 187], it is unsurprising considering the context:
a deceptive dating-profile would most likely exaggerate positive qualities and downplay negative ones. Hence, it is
unlikely that this result would generalize across different text types.
Crabb [32] used POS-tags and lexical diversity for deception detection from the Enron corpus. She used twomethods:
clustering with the Expectation-Maximum algorithm, and calculating means for each feature in isolation to detect
statistically significant differences with respect to deception-cues identified in prior research [2, 50, 63, 80, 95, 100, 186,
187]. Two clusters were deemed most relevant due to the high occurrences of modal, base and present tense verbs,
second-person pronouns, and function words. However, while emails in these clusters generally had higher values for
such features than those in other clusters, not all such values were statistically significant. Further, the lack of ground
truth in the Enron corpus prevented any conclusive inferences to be made concerning the prevalence of deception in
the clusters.
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Studies Data Deception cues Support Oppose
[100] Enron e-mails [85] abstractness, negations, first person pronouns H3 H4
[93] Conference call transcripts general group references, reduced non-
extreme positive emotion terms, reduced third-
person plural pronouns
H3
[166] Online dating profiles reduced first-person singular pronouns,
negations, reduced word count, reduced nega-
tive emotion words
H4 H1
[64] Fraudulent scientific papers words related to scientific methodology, ampli-
fying terms, certainty-related words, emo-
tional words, reduced diminisher terms, re-
duced adjectives
H1, H2
[32] Enron e-mails [85] modal, base and present tense verbs, second-
person pronouns, function words
H4
Table 3. Linguistic cues of non-elicited deception
Bold: support H1–H4
Italics: do not support H1–H4
Hancock and Markowitz [64] used linguistic information to classify papers by the social psychologist Diederik
Stapel, who famously fabricated data to many publications. ey observed the following tendencies in Stapel’s fraud-
ulent papers in comparison to truthful ones:
• more terms related to scientific methodology
• more amplifying terms (e.g. extreme, exceptionally, vastly)
• more certainty-related terminology
• more emotional terminology
• fewer diminisher terms (e.g. somewhat, partly, slightly)
• fewer adjectives
Hancock and Markowitz’ [64] results thus provide support for the hypotheses that deceivers generally exaggerate
the content they want the receiver to believe (H1) and their level of certainty (H2), while providing less qualitative
descriptions (H3). eir model correctly classified 71% of Stapel’s papers. While this was significantly beer than
random choice, the authors express caution about the feasibility of their method for broader forensic use, citing the
large error rate and the domain-specificity of scientific discourse.
Studies on non-elicited deception are summarized in Table 3. e results are mostly in line with experimental
research (Table 2): common features include high emotional load (H1), certainty-related terminology (H2), abstract-
ness (H3), and the reduced use of first-person pronouns (H4). However, as in experimental studies, the evidence is
contradictory concerning emotional words and first-person pronouns.
2.2 Deception detection from online text
In this section we focus on two specific topics relevant for online security: fake reviews and troll comments. We
argue that both present unique properties not inferrable from the results reviewed in Section 2.1. We further discuss
alternative methods for their detection, and evaluate the importance of pure text analysis as a tool for these tasks.
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2.2.1 Fake reviews. One major source of deceptive online text is fake reviewing, where the reviewer deliberately
aempts to (mis)lead the audience into believing something about a product [146, 169]. Fake reviews may have special
properties in comparison to other forms of deception, and are therefore allocated a separate section in this survey.
As Yoo and Gretzel [179] point out, fake reviewers are oen professionals, and can typically model their writing on
real reviews. Additionally, a fake review does not need to be fraudulent with respect to the author’s actual opinions.
Instead, its deceptiveness stems from the purpose of the author to spam a site for some ulterior reason instead of
providing informative reviews. Hence, fake reviews are not necessarily disbelieved by the author, but the content is
irrelevant to the author’s true goal: they instantiate deception of intention.
For supervised methods, obtaining labeled data constitutes a major challenge, and studies have typically collected
their own data. e largest corpus of elicited fake reviews has been compiled by O et al. and contains 400 fake and
400 truthful reviews of both the positive [128] and negative [129] kind.4 Additionally, the website Yelp provides a
corpus of filtered reviews suspected to be fake.5
Human written reviews O et al. [128] detected deceptive pieces in TripAdvisor hotel review data generated via
AmazonMechanical Turk. Combining psycholinguistic features from the LIWC soware [131] and word bigrams, they
achieved an accuracy of 89.8%, and summarize their results as follows:
“(…) truthful opinions tend to include more sensorial and concrete language than deceptive opinions;
(…) we observe an increased focus in deceptive opinions on aspects external to the hotel being re-
viewed
(…) our deceptive reviews have more positive and fewer negative emotion terms.
(…) we find increased first person singular to be among the largest indicators of deception” [128]
ese findings stand in stark contrast to H4, since here deception is indicated by an increase in first-person pronouns
and hence a more personal narrative. is trend turns out to be prevalent in fake reviews, providing support for Yoo
and Gretzel’s [179] contention that fake reviews differ from other forms of deception. On the other hand, O et al. also
found that fake reviews were more abstract and less specific, in line with H3 and against Yoo and Gretzel’s analysis of
fake reviews having a special status due to the availability of information.
Feng et al. [50] further improved O et al.’s [128] results by adding syntactic phrase structure to the stylometric eval-
uation of the same dataset, reaching 91.2% accuracy. As features they used both word bigrams and abstract syntactic
relations derived from a context-free grammar parse.
O et al.’s first study [128] was concerned with positive hotel reviews. In a subsequent study [129], the same authors
applied the method to negative reviews, also gathered via Amazon Mechanical Turk. ey achieved a F-score of c.a.
86% with n-gram-based support vector machines (SVMs). Negative fake reviews contained less spatial information
and had a larger verb-to-noun ratio than truthful reviews. ey also manifested an excess of negative emotion terms,
in direct contrast with the high use of positive terms in the prior study. O et al. interpret these results as opposing
the hypothesis that negative words indicate the emotional distress involved in lying [45]. Rather, the increased use of
emotional terminology can be explained by the intention of the deceiver to communicate certain contents, which is
why the prevalent emotions will vary along with these intentions. High emotional load may still be a useful deception
cue, but it results from a more general property of emphasis, and is not ubiquituously negative.
Yoo and Gretzel [179] tested seven hypotheses on the linguistic properties of fake hotel reviews:
4e corpus is available at hp://myleo.com.
5hps://www.yelp.com/dataset
11
“(a) Deceptive reviews contain more words.
(b) Deceptive reviews are less complex.
(c) Deceptive reviews are less diverse.
(d) Deceptive reviews contain less self-references (immediacy).
(e) Deceptive reviews contain a greater number of references to the hotel brand.
(f) Deceptive reviews contain a greater percentage of positive words.
(g) Deceptive reviews contain a smaller percentage of negative words.”
Hypotheses (e–g) were confirmed, while (a–d) were not. In fact, the opposite hypotheses to (b) and (d) received
support: fake reviewers used more complex language and more self-references than truthful reviewers. ese results
imply that fake reviews may differ from other types of deception by oen being conducted by experts. Further, based
on O et al.’s results [128, 129], it seems likely that (f–g)’s success was due to the reviews’ promotional nature, and
would plausibly not be replicated on negative review data.
Hue et al. [68] base their analysis of deceptive reviews on two properties: sentiment and readability. Sentiment is
relevant since fraudulent reviewers likely have the intention of slanting the review either in favour of or against the
product. Hue et al. further argue that in addition to sentiment varying randomly across different reviews by a genuine
author, the same should be true of readability, measurable by e.g. the Automated Readability Index (ARI) based on
the amount of characters within words and the amount of words within sentences [160]. In contrast, they maintain
that readability should remain high and consistent across fraudulent reviews, since these aim at a maximally general
audience. Using the Wald-Wolfowitz Runs test to detect non-randomness in manually labelled data from Amazon
reviews, they provide empirical confirmation for constancy in both sentiment and readability as indicators of fake
reviews.
Li et al. [98] studied linguistic generalities across fake reviews, which they divided between expert-generated and
crowdsourced spam. ey note that the commmon assumption of fake reviews lacking in detail [97, 128] is not true
of expert-generated reviews. For crowdsourced reviews, their results accorded with previous studies indicating that
fake reviews are less specific, and thus contain less descriptive terms like nouns or adjectives [10, 17, 18, 145]. is,
however, was not the case for expert-generated fake reviews, which were highly informative and descriptive. Other
linguistic cues Li et al. discovered were exaggerated sentiment and the overuse of first person singular pronouns. e
laer result was contradictory to many previous studies proclaiming that deceivers avoid talking about themselves
[18, 86, 124, 185].
Xu et al. [177] based their unsupervised fake review classifier on the text’s generality, i.e. lack of informativity. e
model ranked reviews based on “spamicity”, the top reviews being most spam-like. Based on O et al.’s claim that
online review sites typically contain 8% − 15% spam, they tested their model by treating the top k % as spam, where
the value of k was varied between 5%, 10% and 15%. Accuracy was tested by comparing the top k % to its supervised
classification by SVMs [26]. Applying the model to three review datasets, Xu et al. obtained F-scores of 75.2% − 78.8%
with k = 5%, 72.2% − 76.6% with k = 10%, and 69.4% − 71.7% with k = 15%. As they note, their method only works
for reviews for products that are unavailable for the fake reviewer to investigate, such as restaurants or hotels. e
assumption of fake reviews lacking specificity does not hold for products of which much information is available via
commercials or other descriptions, since the reviewer could use such information in constructing the spam [179].
e results from fake review studies are summarized in Table 4. A recurring theme is the lack of specificity, but
this depends on the assumption that the reviewer does not access information about the product [177]. High or low
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Studies Data Deception cues Support Oppose
[179] Hotel reviews (positive, experi-
mentally elicited)
high complexity, first person pronouns, brand
names, positive words, decreased negative
words
H4
[128] Hotel reviews (positive, crowd-
sourced)
reduced specificity, external information,
positive sentiment, reduced negative senti-
ment, first person singular pronouns, high verb-
to-noun ratio
H3 H4
[129] Hotel reviews (negative, crowd-
sourced)
(in negative reviews:) reduced specificity,
negative emotion terms, high verb-to-noun ra-
tio
H3
[68] Amazon.com reviews high readability, constancy of sentiment
[98] Hotel, restaurant, and doctor
reviews (crowdsourced)
unspecificity (non-expert reviews), specificity
(expert reviews), exaggerated sentiment,
first person singular pronoun
H1 H3, H4
[177] Amazon audioCD, TripAdvisor
(hotels), Yelp (restaurants)
text generality H3
Table 4. Linguistic properties of fake reviews
Bold: support H1–H4
Italics: do not support H1–H4
sentiment has also been demonstrated to be relevant as in other forms of deception, but its direction depends on
the nature of the review (positive or negative). Increased use of the first person pronoun stands in contrast to results
received on other forms of deception (see Section 2.1), supportingYoo and Gretzel’s [179] contention about fake reviews
constituting a sui generis type of deception. Yoo and Gretzel’s analysis of fake reviews being special due to the amount
of detailed information available receives partial support from Li et al. [98], but only for expert-generated reviews.
Automatically generated reviews Automatic text generation is a vast field within NLP [34], and poses an additional
threat to review sites. Detecting automatically generated reviews is a different task than detecting man-made fake
reviews, due to the different nature of the deception. In automatically generated reviews, the deception concerns
identity: the message is meant to look like it is wrien by a human, but is in fact machine-generated.
Hovy [66] automatically generated fake reviews using a 7-gram Markov chain trained with data from the review
site Trustpilot. For classification, he used logistic regression with word n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 4) as features. e classifier
additionally sought irregularities between age, gender, review category, and n-grams. Adding such meta-information
to the model significantly improved its ability to fool the classifier. However, while exact copies of training reviews
were removed, a 7-grammodel will likely reproduce large chunks of the training data. Duplicate or similarity detection
between the training data and the generated reviews was not conducted by Hovy.
Yao et al. [178] generated fake reviews with a character-level Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) trained with restau-
rant reviews from Yelp.6 ey were unable to distinguish RNN-generated reviews reliably from those in the Yelp
corpus, using linear SVMs with various linguistic features, the plagiarism detection method Winnowing [151], or hu-
man evaluators from Amazon Mechanical Turk (n = 594). ese results demonstrate that machine-generated fake
reviews can resist classification by common methods. However, Yao et al. suggest an alternative defence against their
6hps://www.yelp.com/dataset
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RNN-generated fake reviews, based on statistical differences in character distributions between generated reviews and
the training corpus.
Juuti et al. [77] utilized Neural Machine Translation (NMT) to generate context-appropriate restaurant reviews.
ey demonstrated a superior performance to Yao et al. [178] in fooling human users trying to distinguish between
genuine and generated reviews. In their user study, Juuti et al. were able to avoid detection at a rate of 3.5/4, as opposed
to 0.8/4 with Yao et al.’s method. By controlling the context (e.g. restaurant name, type of food, review rating etc.)
they can further generate reviews of a specific type with a single NMT model. Despite successfully deceiving human
readers, they were able to detect generated reviews with a very high F1-score of 97%, using an AdaBoost classifier
trained on words, POS n-grams, dependency tag n-grams, and NLTK’s [11] readability features.
Recent developments in automatic text generation demonstrate that automating the task of fake reviewing is an
increasing threat. As generated reviews do not display particular similarities to human-wrien fake reviews [77],
there is no reason to believe that the hypotheses H1–H4 have any particular relevance here. Text generators mimic
the writing style of their training corpus, which by assumption contains mostly genuine reviews. Hence, standard
deception detection has no bearing on this issue. Instead, classifying generated reviews requires knowledge of the
generation model itself, in which case they remain detectable [77, 178]. However, as such knowledge is not always
available, the problem cannot be considered solved.
2.2.2 Trolling and cyberbullying. Troll users deliberately post malicious content to online forums, either to harass
others for amusement or with the intention of advancing an agenda. Paid trolls post professionally on behalf of an
institution (e.g. a political candidate, government, or corporation), while mentioned trolls are identified as trolls by
other users [115]. Cyberbullying is a related phenomenon, where the author targets a particular victim instead of an
entire forum. While trolls or cyberbullies are not exclusively dishonest, there is major overlap in the purposes of a
deceiver and a troll: both write content with a purpose other than its truthful communication. Especially professional
trolls have no necessary connection between their actual opinion and what they write, and therefore are likely to write
content they believe to be false. Additionally, even if a troll writes something he believes, his intention is nevertheless
fraudulent. Similar considerations apply for cyberbullying. It is therefore initially plausible that trolling/cyberbullying
and other forms deception detection might overlap in linguistic features.
Cambria et al. utilized sentic computing to classify texts according to the likelihood of being authored by a troll [23].
As a knowledge-based method, sentic computing is more grammatically and semantically oriented than many other
current NLP approaches, as it is built on a pre-programmed set of “common-sense” concepts and inference paerns
[24]. Cambria et al. used the method to aest the emotional content of the data, based on the following scales:
“1. the user is happy with the service provided (Pleasantness)
2. the user is interested in the information supplied (Aention)
3. the user is comfortable with the interface (Sensitivity)
4. the user is disposed to use the application (Aptitude)” [23]
Cambria et al., classify human emotions by these four dimensions together with polarity, i.e. whether the emotion
is positive or negative. ey found that troll posts had a high absolute value of Sensitivity and a generally negative
polarity. Trolls manifested either significantly high or low levels of comfort with the interface, together with a negative
sentiment. Testing on a manually classified test set of troll and non-troll Twier messages, Cambria et al. received an
F-score of 78% (82% precision, 75% recall).
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Studies Data source Cues to trolling/bullying
[23] Twier negative sentiment
[153] Discussion forum negative sentiment
[115] Discussion forum bag-of-words, negative sentiment
[27] Youtube comments offensive words, intensifiers
[175] Twier fear-related words
Table 5. Linguistic properties of troll comments
J.-M. Xu et al. [175] used sentiment analysis to detect cyberbullying from Twier. ey manually classified seven
emotions relevant for bullying: anger, embarrassment, empathy, fear, pride, relief and sadness. Fear was by far themost
common emotion in their cyberbullying dataset, whether the author was identified as a bully, a victim, an accuser or
a bystander. ese results indicate that fear-related terminology may be informative of bullying as a topic, but not of
the status of the author as the bully.
Troll posts are commonly negative, being targeted against some viewpoint or a person. Using the hypothesis that
negative sentiment is indicative of trolling, Seah et al. [153] applied sentiment analysis to online forum posts. ey
received a generalized receiver operating characteristic of 78% with binary classification and 69% with ordinal classifi-
cation.
Mihaylov and Nakov [115] used various linguistic and metalinguistic features to detect both paid and mentioned
troll comments in news community forums. ey received an F1-score of 78% for mentioned trolls and 80% for paid
trolls. Despite the slight differences between the troll types, they conclude that both paid and mentioned trolls be-
have similarly in comparison to non-trolls. Among linguistic features, bag-of-words fared well overall, as opposed to
more abstract grammatical properties like POS-tags. However, metalinguistic features were more effective than any
linguistic feature.
Offensive language is an important factor in trolling and cyberbullying. Following Jay and Janschewitz [70], Chen
et al. [27] characterize offensive language as vulgar, pornographic or hateful. For evaluating the overall offensiveness
of sentences, Chen et al. used an offensive word lexicon that included manual measures for words collected from
Youtube comments, and further measurements based on a word’s syntactic context. Detecting offensive users in an
online discussion corpus, they receive 78% in both precision and recall.
A related issue is hate speech, the detection of which has been explored in a number of studies [6, 20, 35, 41, 57,
125, 152, 170, 174, 181]. Hate speech is only occasionally deceptive, which is why we do not discuss it in detail here.
However, a brief summary of the findings in this field is worth taking into account. First, character n-grams have
generally performed well across hate speech datasets, which is likely due to their flexibility across spelling variants
[62, 111, 152]. Second, offensive word lexicons have not performed well in the absence of n-gram features [125, 152].
ird, while deep learning approaches have becomemore popular thanmore basicmachine learningmethods [6, 181], a
comparative study byGro¨ndahl et al. [62] demonstrated that their performance did not significantly differ when trained
on the same datasets. Finally, the same study showed that even state-of-the-art approaches are highly vulnerable to
simple text transformations like removing spaces or adding innocuous words. Such evasion techniques are similar to
earlier methods of evading spam detection [102, 188].
Reviewing the main results of the troll detection studies discussed in this section, the most prevalent cue is negative
sentiment. It clearly does not suffice, as non-troll messages can also have negative sentiment, and not all trolls are
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negative. At most the results indicate that negative sentiment is indicative of an increased probability of trolling. Like
with fake reviews, studies on troll and cyberbullying detection reflect the fact that content, much more than writing
style, has determined the success of classification. Hence, the results do not support the plausibility of a content-
invariant detection scheme.
2.3 Deception detection: future prospects
Summarizing the studies reviewed in Sections 2.1–2.2, some results have been replicated in multiple studies. In par-
ticular, deceptive texts oen have a high emotional load and a large frequency of certainty-related terms, while troll
posts tend to have a negative sentiment. However, a more fine-grained analysis demonstrates that the relevant features
have been highly content- and context-sensitive. Hence, they are unlikely to scale beyond the semantic domains of
particular datasets. erefore, we suggest that detecting deception is more efficient with methods outside of purely
linguistic analysis. Specifically, we recommend semantic comparison between different documents. For example, Mi-
haylov et al. [114] used various measures to detect troll users from an online news community forum, among which
was comment-to-publication similarity. eir hypothesis was that trolls may be prone to deliberately cite news articles
in a misleading fashion to support their own perspective. is feature had a positive effect on classification, and links
troll-detection to rumor-debunking, where similar content-comparison methods prevail [147].
A related approach to unsupervised fake review classification is the detection of semantic and grammatical similari-
ties between reviews. Suchmethods rely on the assumption that spammers tend to repeat the samemessage in multiple
places. Narisawa et al. [122] classified spam based on the similarity measure of string alienness, obtaining F1-scores
between 50% and 80%. Uemura et al. [167] detected review spam using document complexity (based on the amount
of similar documents within the corpus), and received F1-scores between 66% and 73%. Lau et al.’s [94] unsupervised
model was also based on duplicate detection based on semantic overlap.
Of course, semantic comparison measures do not detect author intentions, such as deceptiveness. is task may
well be impossible in principle if only text data is used. Our literature review indicates that deceptiveness as an author
intention does not leave a content-invariant linguistic trace. Deception may, at most, correlate with certain linguistic
properties in particular semantic domains. Restricted to a domain, linguistic features may still be useful in aiding
deception detection, at least when used in combination with metalinguistic data concerning e.g. user behavior on the
forum.
3 AUTHOR IDENTIFICATION AND ADVERSARIAL STYLOMETRY
In this section we discuss author identification from an adversarial perspective, where detection and its evasion are
treated as competing tasks. Avoiding deanonymization or profiling involves obfuscating writing style, for which a
variety of techniques has been suggested. Style transformation for anonymization or imitation purposes constitutes a
type of deception, albeit different in kind from those reviewed in Section 2. ere, we characterized deception, broadly
understood, as aempting to lead the reader into believing something false. In style transformation, the relevant
information involves author identity or profile, the first concerning individual identity and laer membership in a
broader group. Unless mentioned otherwise, the studies reviewed have concerned author identification. With respect
to profiling, features are likely to vary depending on the classes under interest (age, gender, occupation etc.), which
makes results less generalizable. However, some style transformation studies have concentrated on profiling instead
of identification [136, 157].
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We begin by reviewing the state-of-the-art in stylometry research in Section 3.1. We then advance to information
security -related uses of author identification, to which we devote Section 3.2. Aer introducing the deanonymization
aack [121], we dedicate Section 3.3 to discussing its mitigation by style obfuscation or imitation.
3.1 Author identification
e success of author identification depends on the validity of the Human Stylome Hypothesis (HSH) [168], which
maintains that authors have a unique writing style that is retained to a significant extent between different texts, even
across variation in semantic content. Its validity is obviously not a binary maer, and will inevitably differ between
authors and datasets. Nevertheless, general trends found in empirical work contribute useful indicators of its suitability
for real-world applications. In this section we provide a concise review of existing work in author identification. For
further discussion, we refer to prior surveys dedicated solely to this topic [123, 163].
ere is a close affinity between writing styles and idiolects as speaker-specific (mental) grammars, which can dif-
fer among members of the same language community. e idea that lexical repositories and grammatical rules vary
between individual speakers is a well-aested linguistic fact [12, 31, 127, 150]. While this gives the HSH initial plau-
sibility, it is worth bearing in mind that idiolects reflect a large variety of factors, not limited to choices between
content-equivalent stylistic variants. Indeed, the linguistic literature on idiolects has oen focused on semantic vari-
ation between authors [53, 101]. Another problem for the HSH is the prevalence of style-shi. As the sociolinguist
William Labov stated: “ere are no single style speakers” [91]. If a speaker can change between styles in different con-
texts, stylometric classification might not capture author identity but rather “style clusters” spanning many authors,
who conversely can belong to multiple clusters. Recent results on large-scale stylometric clustering accord with this
hypothesis [123].
e problematicity of HSH notwithstanding, concrete examples of author identification can be found outside aca-
demic research. In 2011, an American man was found to be the true author of a blog supposedly wrien by a Syrian
woman [9]. While stylometry was not responsible for the finding, Afroz et al. [2] demonstrated that a close linguistic
correlation could be found between the blog and other texts by the same author. In 2013, stylometric analysis per-
formed by Peter Millican and Patrick Juola on the novel e Cuckoo’s Nest revealed its likely author to be J.K. Rowling
under a pseudonym, which she later confirmed.7 Juola [74] also reports a real-life court case where an asylum-seeker
claimed to have wrien newspaper articles critical of his government, for which he would have faced persecution if
not granted the asylum. As evidence, he provided other articles provably wrien by him, and the court had to evaluate
their similarity to the contested articles. In such cases, stylometry can provide assistance for making decisions with
large-scale consequences.
A significant problem in the field is the lack of consensus on which features to use [73, 141, 148, 149]. e most
prevalent collection argued to be optimal for identifying individual authors even from short texts is the “Writeprints”
feature set [1, 183]. It consists of a variety of character-based, lexical, syntactic, and structural features, as partly
presented in Table 6. e set was introduced by Zheng et al. [183], who used it to identify authors with 97.69%
accuracy from a corpus containing 20 candidate authors, and 30 − 92 articles of 84 − 346 words from each candidate. I
has since been used in multiple studies [1, 2, 4, 48, 109, 130], and is partially implemented in the JStylo soware [109].
While large-scale comparisons between different features applied to the same datasets have been rare, existing com-
parative studies indicate that low-level features like short character n-grams (including unigrams) have a systematically
7For Juola’s description of the study, see hp://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=5315.
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Feature types Example features
Lexical
Character number of characters, number
of leers, number of digits, fre-
quency of leers, frequency of
special leers
Word number of words, average
word length, vocabulary
richness, average sentence
length
Syntactic frequency of punctuations, fre-
quency of function words
Structural number of sentences, number
of paragraphs, number of sen-
tences/words/characters in a
paragraph, has quotes
Content-specific frequency of content specific
keywords
Table 6. Examples of the Writeprints features (270 altogether) [183]
high performance. Grieve [61] applied 39 features prevalent in prior work (before 2007) to a single dataset, using the
chi-square test for producing a ranking of the most likely authors. e top-5 feature types with the best performance
were word unigrams (including punctuation) and character n-grams in the order 2 > 3 > 4 > 1 from most to least
successful. In contrast, positional features, vocabulary richness, sentence length, and word length had only modest
or poor performance. A higher prevalence of function words in comparison to content words further improved the
success rate, which is in line with traditional assumptions of style being especially manifested in function words [118].
Juola [73] summarizes over 3 million experiments he and colleagues made on the same datasets comparing combina-
tions of features, pre-processing methods, and classifiers included in the authorship aribution soware JGAAP [72].
e datasets were taken from an author aribution competition [71], and are provided with JGAAP. e best results
were achieved with punctuation features, using nearest neighbours with Manhaan distance for analysis. According
to Juola, a likely explanation of these results is that the corpus exhibited a particularly large variance in quotation
marks and other non-alphanumeric notation. erefore, the results are not applicable to datasets where such features
have been normalized.
Pohast et al. [134] evaluate the performance of 15 suggested techniques on three datasets. eir results suggest that
using compression improves the stability of performance across different corpora. e basic idea behind compression
is that single compressed files are produced of the candidate author’s texts both alone and together with the unknown
author’s texts, and divergence is then measured between these files [90, 108]. Pohast et al. further remark that
character features were the most effective overall. Similar conclusions regarding compression and character features
are reached in a larger comparative study by Neal et al. [123], who evaluate 14 open-source algorithms on a corpus
containing 1000 authors. Summarizing their results, the authors note that low-level features like characters fare beer
especially on smaller samples, where high-level features like syntactic dependencies are sparse.
In addition to the discrepancy between feature sets across different studies, a further problem in stylometry research
concerns whether the features are more indicative of style or content. Evidently, highly content-related features like
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lexical choices are not applicable across different genres or domains [5, 123]. is is likely among the main reasons
for the success of function words [21, 118, 182], which have also been argued to correlate with personality types [28],
and form the basis of the linguistic profiling soware LIWC [131, 165]. Small susceptibility to content changes is also
a virtue of punctuation features [73] and grammatical structure [65, 133, 139].
With respect to classification algorithms, most stylometry research has focused on traditional supervised machine
learning methods, such as SVMs, decision trees, Bayesian classification, or distance metrics [123, 163]. SVMs have
been particularly popular due to their strong performance on high-dimensional and sparse data [163]. Deep learning
applications have recently become more prominent, with a particular focus on recurrent and convolutional neural
networks [7, 56, 164]. Brocordo et al. [16] also experiment with deep belief networks, which belong to the class of
probabilistic generative models. While deep learning methods have generally demonstrated a strong performance in
many NLP tasks [58, 180], their large training data requirements present problems with smaller author corpora [123].
Recent approaches to transfer learning in NLP have aempted to improve classifier scalability by first training an initial
model to perform some task using a large training set, and subsequently fine-tuning the model for different tasks with
smaller additional training sets [40, 67]. However, the transferability of other text classifiers to author identification is
yet to be studied.
In order to succeed beyond artificial experimental conditions, author identification should be feasible across a large
number of candidates with small example corpora from each. However, as Neal et al. [123] state in their survey,
existing techniques face challenges in such seings. To detect potential author groups, they performed graph-based
clustering in a large corpus. e number of clusters (16) was much smaller than the number of authors (1000), and
there was no clear separation between authors. Neal et al. note the possibility that the clusters represent “meta-classes”
characterizing multiple authors, and a single author can belong to many such classes. ese results are in line with
Labov’s dictum that a speaker is never bound to a single style, and vice versa [91]. However, it is worth noting that
if these hypothetical “meta-classes” are simply assimilated with the clusters, the claim is difficult to either confirm or
falsify.
e largest aempt at author identification so far has been contributed by Narayanan et al. [121], whose data
was derived from 100, 000 different blogs. e features used were post length, vocabulary richness, word shape (the
distribution of lower- and upper-case leers), word length, and the frequencies of leers, digits, punctuation, special
characters, function words, and syntactic category pairs. Narayanan et al. correctly predicted the author in over 20%
of the cases, which is a significant increase from random chance. Still, from the perspective of deanonymization, the
approach cannot be considered successful, as it was far more likely to yield a false prediction than the correct one.
ere is no single universally accepted protocol for author identification that could be used directly “out-of-the-
box”. While significant overlap can be found in the features and classifiers used, most studies have been unique
with respect to the particular subset of features, and have not conducted systematic evaluations between different
combinations. Soware like Signature,8 JGAAP [72], JStylo [109], and RStylo [43] have been developed to alleviate
this problem by allowing researchers to conduct stylometric tests with a simple GUI, selecting from a list of pre-
programmed features and classifiers. Some of these systems are very restricted in the range of features they offer,
which limits their application potential. For instance, RStylo only uses word- or character n-grams, and does not allow
8hp://www.philocomp.net/humanities/signature.htm
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their combination in the same test. e most featurally sophisticated application is JStylo, which contains a subset of
the Writeprints feature set [183].
Neal et al. [123] give two plausible reasons for the commonly observed effectiveness of short character n-grams
in comparison to high-level properties like abstract grammatical relations. First, the laer are sparse in short texts,
whereas all texts contain characters. Second, character-features are less susceptible to noise, such as misspellings
or grammatical errors. In addition to these benefits, we believe that character-features can have an exceptionally
high correlation with many other features. For instance, the prevalence of particular function words will impact
the frequency of their characters, making character-features indirectly responsive to changes in function word use.
Hence, low-level features like character n-grams have the potential to record (partial) information of a large variety
of textual properties. ey can therefore be expected to fare generally beer than high-level features, at least with
small corpora. Character-features also have the advantage of being language-independent in the sense of requiring no
language-specific pre-processing, such as tokenization, POS-tagging, or parsing [123].
3.2 Implications for security and privacy
Author identification and profiling have a multifaceted relation to information security. Forensic studies have been on
the forefront in traditional stylometry research, providing assistance in uncovering the identities of criminals [31, 110].
Similar methods can help to unmask troll users in online forums. As a case study, Galn-Garcia et al. [54] linked troll
profiles to their true profiles, and successfully applied the method to a real-life cyberbullying case. Another important
application is the detection of doppelga¨ngers or sockpuppets, i.e. users with multiple accounts. Solorio et al. [161]
used SVMs with 239 linguistic features to detect sockpuppet accounts from Wikipedia user comments, and reached a
68% accuracy. Afroz et al. [3] used stylometric techniques to link doppelga¨nger users with unsupervised clustering,
achieving 85% precision and 82% recall on an underground forum dataset.
In contrast to the assistance that author identification can provide for increasing online security, it also constitutes
a privacy threat by making it possible to deanonymize authors against their will. Brennan et al. [14] propose an
adversarial scenario they call Alice the anonymous blogger versus Bob the abusive employer, where an employer uses
stylometry to uncover the author of an anonymous complaint. Another potential adversarial purpose of deanonymiza-
tion is bullying or harassment [4]. In general, the abusive part can be played by any person or institution, such as a
government, corporation, or individual. Narayanan et al. [121] coined the term deanonymization aack to denote such
scenarios. ey further take their empirical results on blog author identification to indicate that the aack is not only
a theoretical possibility but a real-life concern.
As we reviewed in Section 3.1, Narayanan et al. were able to detect a blog author from 100, 000 candidates with ca.
20% accuracy [121]. We also noted that, while these results demonstrate a major increase from random chance, they
nevertheless most oen fail to find the correct author. Still, they are genuinely disconcerting from the perspective
of potential victims of a deanonymization aack. In designing secure systems, it is essential to assume a low bar for
the aacker and a high bar for the defender. Applying this principle to the deanonymization aack, we conclude
that since stylometry can significantly increase the chances of the aacker correctly guessing the author’s identity,
it constitutes a genuine privacy threat. Additionally, results on smaller author corpora (≤ 20) indicate that high
accuracy can be achieved with features contained in Writeprints [1, 183], or similar sets [123, 163]. In many variants
of the deanonymization aack, assuming a fairly restricted candidate set is justified: for example, in Brennan et al.’s
[14] scenario (see above) the candidates are restricted to Bob’s employees.
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Motivated by their findings, Narayanan et al. [121] recommend the development of automated tools for trans-
forming writing style while preserving meaning. e field of adversarial stylometry [14] involves the study of such
countermeasures to deanonymization. In Section 3.3 we review the work conducted in this field, and evaluate whether
the deanonymization aack can realistically be mitigated using existing methods.
3.3 Adversarial stylometry
We define style obfuscation as any method aimed at fooling stylometric classification. A more restricted variant of
obfuscation is imitation, where misclassification is intended to target a particular author. Imitation also constitutes an
aack, with the original author as the aacker and the imitated author as the victim. We divide obfuscation methods
into three basic types: manual, computer-assisted and automatic. e subsections 3.3.1–3.3.3 are divided by these
methods, and within each subsection studies are reviewed in the order of publication. If one study has used several
methods, its results are divided among the subsections.
3.3.1 Manual obfuscation. Brennan and Greenstadt [15] experimented with two manual methods of masking the
original author of a text: obfuscation and imitation. e former involved conscious altering of a text to avoid displaying
properties characteristic of the author, and in the laer authors aempted to mimic the style of another writer. e
results form the Brennan-Greenstadt Corpus. In a subsequent study, Brennan et al. [14] used Amazon Mechanical Turk
to crowdsource the obfuscation task. e results, alongwith the original corpus, form the Extended Brennan-Greenstadt
corpus, which is provided with the JStylo soware [109]. Brennan et al. evaluated obfuscated and imitated texts with
three methods: neural networks with the Basic-9 feature set,9 a synonym-based classifier [29], and SVMs with the
Writeprints features [183]. Both obfuscation and imitation resulted in the success rates of all methods dropping sig-
nificantly, only the SVM-Writeprints classifier remaining above a chance level. Imitation also succeeded in reaching
the correct targets. e SVM method was most resistant against both obfuscation and imitation. e effectiveness of
the (original) Brennan-Greenstadt corpus against the authorship aribution program JGAAP [72] was further demon-
strated by Juola and Vescovi [76]. Amazon Mechanical Turk was also successfully used by Almishari et al. [4] to
reduce automatic author recognition. Both obfuscation and readability evaluation were crowdsourced. On a scale
from 1 (“Poor”) to 5 (“Excellent”), the average readability score was 4.29, indicating success in retaining the original
meaning to a significant degree.
e results reviewed here indicate that writing style can be manually altered to deceive author identification. Con-
trary to the strong interpretation of the HSH, it thus seems possible to change one’s writing style, at least with delib-
eration. However, manual obfuscation is very time-consuming and laborious. Having to consciously alter the style of
everything one wants to write anonymously is not a scalable solution. Crowdsourcing is a possible way to outsource
manual obfuscation, but Almishari et al. [4] note, sending your original writings to strangers constitutes a privacy
risk. Conceivably, the adversary could even act as a Mechanical Turk worker and see the original text as a job offered
by the author. Crowdsourcing is also relatively slow and costly to use.
3.3.2 Computer-assisted obfuscation. e idea of computer-assisted manual style obfuscation was introduced by
Kacmarik and Gamon [78], who automatically evaluated the feature changes needed to make classification fail with
9e Basic-9 feature set consists of the number of unique words, lexical density, Gunning-Fog readability index, character count (without whitespace),
the average number of syllables per word, sentence count, the average sentence length, and the Flesch-Kincaid Readability Test. Like Writeprints [183],
Basic-9 is also implemented in JStylo [109].
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Koppel and Schler’s [89] author identification technique. ey present a graph linking the features requiring modifi-
cation, allowing the user to monitor their success at obfuscation. Anonymouth [109] uses the stylometric framework
JStylo to evaluate a text wrien by the user against reference corpora. Based on this evaluation, it gives the user in-
structions on modifying the text to evade JStylo. Day et al. [36] developed the concept of Adversarial Authorship, and
implemented it as an application called AuthorWeb. It displays a user other texts similar to their current writing in
style, allowing them to obfuscate text by controlling which texts their current writing resembles.
Computer-assisted methods can be useful in comparison to the fully manual approach, given that they reduce the
cognitive load involved in deciding which features to alter. Without external cues the author would need to guess
which changes to make, which would be unaainable in practice. However, a problem with automatic evaluators like
Anonymouth is their reliance on specific corpora and classifiers, whichmay be unavailable for the author. Furthermore,
while computer-assisted obfuscation is easier than purely manual methods, choosing the candidate remains in the
hands of the user. Manual work is still needed, which makes these approaches unfeasible in a large scale.
3.3.3 Automatic obfuscation. Fully automated author masking is, unsurprisingly, significantly more difficult to im-
plement than manual or computer-assisted obfuscation. is section reviews studies conducted in this field, and eval-
uates the performance of the most prominent methods.
Iterative language translatione easiest and most common method used for automatic style alteration and hence
author obfuscation is machine translation (MT) across one or more languages back to the source language. is can
also be called Iterative Language Translation (ILT) [105], as its effect can be increased by multiple iterations. It was
first suggested by Rao and Rohatgi [142] and has since been applied in multiple studies, with divergent results. Here,
we survey and analyze this research. All the studies reviewed have used English as the language to obfuscate. With
the exception of Keswani et al. [81], Google Translate has been used for translation, sometimes compared with the
Bing translator. It should also be noted that, with one exception [157], all the studies were conducted prior to Google’s
major update that replaced phrase-based statistical MT with deep neural networks (DNNs) [171].
ILT was aempted by Brennan et al. [14] with both Google and Bing translators. ey used German and Japanese
as intermediate languages, experimenting with English–German–English, English–Japanese–English, and English–
German–Japanese–English (the first two exemplifying one-step and the last two-step translation). Success of obfusca-
tion was measured with a synonym-based classifier, a neural network with the Writeprints features, and an SVM with
the Basic-9 features (see footnote 9). Approximately, in one-step translations the success rate of the synonym-based
method declined from 85% to 75%, and the success rates of the neural network and SVM classifiers declined from 65%
to 50%. Google obfuscated more with Japanese and Bing with German as the intermediate language. With the excep-
tion of Bing translations evaluated with neural networks and SVMs, two-step translation did not markedly improve
obfuscation. Overall, the results were deemed underwhelming, and the authors concluded that state-of-the-art MT in
2009 did not provide sufficient means for author obfuscation.
Caliskan and Greenstadt [22] also used Google and Bing’s translators with German and Japanese as intermediate
languages, but with English–Japanese–German–English as the two-step translation order. e success of obfuscation
was measured with JGAAP [75][72] and JStylo [109], using what they call the Translation Feature Set, which was
selected via optimization from the Basic-9 and Writeprints feature sets [15, 183].10 Aer obfuscation, the average
recognition rate remained high at 92%, which accorded with Brennan et al.’s [14] pessimistic conclusions about ILT.
10e Translation Feature Set contained the following features: average characters per word, character count, function words, leers, punctuation,
special characters, top leer bigrams, top leer trigrams, words, and word lengths [22].
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Caliskan and Greenstadt further classified translated texts based on the translator (Google or Bing) with an average
success rate of 91%, indicating that the translation algorithm itself can be “fingerprinted” if appropriate stylometric
features are used.
Using Google Translate, Almishari et al. [4] reduced the linkability between the translated text and the original
author by increasing the amount of intermediate languages up to nine, randomly drawn from the 64 languages offered
by Google Translate in 2014. ey conducted a readability review of 60 translations (produced via nine intermediate
languages) via Amazon Mechanical Turk, receiving an average score of 2.8/5. e readability of a subset of translated
texts was further improved manually (also via Mechanical Turk), retaining author anonymity. However, without a
comparison to texts produced with other methods, the readability score alone does not tell much about the status of
the obfuscated texts.
Mack et al. translated English blog texts back and forth through Arabic, Chinese and Spanish with one to three
iterations [105]. e results were evaluated with four Author Identification Systems (AISs): a unigram-based AIS, the
O. de Vel et al. AIS [37], a combination of the previous two called Hybrid-I, and Hybrid-I with added syntactic features
(Hybrid-II). A genetic algorithm called Genetic and Evolutionary Feature Selection (GEFeS) was further used to mask
nonsalient features from each AIS to improve their performance. e addition of GEFeS resulted in Hybrid-II having
the best performance overall on recognizing the author from the non-obfuscated test corpus (52%), the other AISs
having rates of c.a. 20% − 25%. ILT lowered the identification rate of all AISs with all intermediate languages, Arabic
always faring the best. e most significant result was the decrease of Hybrid-II plus GEFeS’ identification rate from
51.65 % to c.a. 10 % with all languages on the first iteration, and below 10 % with Arabic. Further iterations did not
markedly change the identification rates, irrespective of the language or the AIS.
Day et al. [36] used Google Translate with Spanish and Chinese as intermediate languages. Mack et al.’s Hybrid-II
AIS [105] was used to evaluate the success of obfuscation. With the first iteration, accuracy dropped from 54% to 6%
with Spanish and to 10% with Chinese. Further iterations did not decrease the identification accuracy, as the second
iteration resulted in 6% with Spanish and 11% with Chinese, and the third iteration yielded 7% with Spanish and 11%
with Chinese. Day et al. further used Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) [42] to analyse semantic overlap between the
original and obfuscated texts. is algorithm gives a value between -1 (no similarities) and 1 (full similarity). e LSA-
values were 0.86 for the Spanish-mediated text and 0.77 for the Chinese-mediated text. Day et al. further fingerprinted
the intermediate language with the JGAAP soware [72], receiving accuracies of 93% (Spanish) and 90% (Chinese) on
the first iteration, 98% (Spanish) and 97% (Chinese) on the second iteration, and 98% (Spanish) and 99% (Chinese) on
the third iteration. e number of iterations was also fingerprintable, although less accurately than the translator.
Keswani et al. [81] applied ILT to the author masking task arranged by the PAN 2016 digital forensics event. Using
Moses [88], they created their own translation model trained with the Europarl corpus [87]. e text was translated
through German and French. ree features were evaluated of the obfuscated texts [135]. Safety indicates howwell the
obfuscated text manages to hide original authorship, and was measured by the obfuscation’s impact on classification
by various author verification systems from previous PAN tasks. Keswani et al.’s method succeeded in obfuscation
25% − 42% of the time, depending on the dataset. e sensibility of the obfuscated text and its soundness, i.e. similarity
in meaning with the original text, were both manually evaluated from a small subset of texts. Keswani et al.’s text
was, in Pohast et al.’s words, considered “impossible to read or understand” by the PAN 2016 evaluator due to the
frequency of errors [135].
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Study Translator(s) Languages Iterations Success
[14] Google, Bing German, Japanese 1 − 2 No
[22] Google, Bing Japanese, German 1 − 2 No
[4] Google (Random) ≤ 9 Yes
[105] (Not told) Arabic, Chinese, Spanish 1 − 3 Yes
[36] Google Spanish, Chinese 1 − 3 Yes
[81] Moses German, French 2 Unclear / No
[157] Google (DNN) German, French, Spanish, Finnish, Armenian 2 − 5 No
Table 7. A comparison of studies using ILT for style obfuscation
(“Success” = the reported success of the approach in deceiving author identification, based on the source paper.)
As a baseline for evaluating their Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) approach called A4NT (discussed below),
Shey et al. [157] applied four variants of ILT with Google Translate, using German, French, Spanish, Finnish, and
Armenian as intermediate languages between two and five iterations. None of the variants significantly reduced the
classification rate on a word-based Long Short TermMemory (LSTM) network, the largest drop being from 90% to 81%
in F1-score. Shey et al.’s user study also indicated that ILT did not succeed in maintaining semantic similarity.
Based on our review, one reason for the differing outcomes in ILT-obfuscation seems to be the languages used. As
summarized in Table 7, studies have generally used different intermediate languages and numbers of iterations. While
small-scale comparisons have been made, the effects of varying the languages have not been systematically evaluated.
Results on the effects of iterations are also indecisive. Almishari et al. [4] decreased identification accuracy by adding
iterations, whereas Mack et al. [105] and Day et al. [36] did not. More systematic comparative research would be
needed to properly evaluate the effects of the languages, the number and direction of iterations, and the translation
method. With respect to the last, it is possible that Shey et al.’s [157] failure to obfuscate with Google Translate even
across five intermediate languages was affected by its update from a statistical algorithm to a DNN [171].
It is also likely that ILT will decrease the grammaticality and hence readability of the text, and/or differentiate its
semantic interpretation from the original text [123, 142]. Successful change of style would require three properties
from the resulting text: (i) grammatically soundness, (ii) retention of the original meaning, and (iii) evasion of author
identification. ese properties have not been properly measured together in the ILT-obfuscation studies reviewed in
this section. Additionally, ILT is unreliable due to not taking into account the direction of the obfuscation. e changes
might take the classification to any direction, which may or may not aid obfuscation. As Shey et al. [157] note, a style
obfuscation system should ideally only enact changes that take classification to the desired direction, and no more.
Rule-based substitutions Khosmood and Levinson [82] outline a basic model of rule-based style imitation based on
grammatical changes. e purpose of the system is to alter the style of a source text until it is maximally close to that
of a target corpus. First, both the source text and the target corpus are analysed based on style markers, which are
predetermined linguistic features. Next, the styles of the source text and the target corpus are compared, and their
stylistic distance is determined based on some metric calculated from the style markers. If the distance is large enough,
a predetermined modification rule is applied to the source text that alters some of its style markers. A comparison
between the altered source text and the target corpus is made, resulting in a finished transformation if their stylistic
distance is close enough, and to another modification otherwise. is Classification-Transformation Loop (CTL) [83] is
continued until the stylistic distance is sufficiently close or no more transformations are available.
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Khosmood and Levinson [82] applied the CTL to a US Department of Justice memorandum excerpt, with a part of
Orwell’s Animal Farm as the target corpus. ey used 10 style markers for analysis and comparison, and modified the
source text with three transformation rules of de-hyphenation, lexical substitution and acronym expansion. Stylistic
distance was measured with the root-mean-square-error value, which reduced from 5.77 in the source text to 5.63
in the modified text. In another study [84], the same authors divided text into n-grams between one and five units,
and searched for synonyms for each from Wordnet [49, 117]. For each word/phrase, one synonym was chosen above
others based on its commonness in the target corpus or another database, and the original word/phrase was replaced
with it. Using JGAAP for evaluation, Khosmood and Levinson succeeded in obfuscating seven out of thirteen texts.
Readability was manually evaluated by the authors as “correct”, “passable” or “incorrect”, concluding that the majority
of texts were “passable”. As no additional evaluators were used, and the authors only provide two example obfuscations,
these results are difficult to assess.
Mansoorizadeh et al. [107] employed Wordnet-based lexical substitution for the PAN 2016 Author Masking Task
[135]. Synonyms for the top 200 words used by the author of the training text were found from Wordnet via NLTK.
Two criteria were used in choosing the replacement synonym from the alternatives provided by Wordnet: Wu et
al’s semantic similarity metric [172], and the occurrence probability in the original word’s context measured with a
4-gram language model trained with the Brown corpus. In their evaluation of the PAN 2016 Author Masking Task,
Pohast et al. [135] note that Mansoorizadeh et al.’s algorithm is very conservative, changing at most one word per
sentence. While retaining readability well, this also results in reduced safety against author identification. Further,
certain replacements resulted in semantic errors, such as machine being exchanged for car. e system succeeded
in obfuscation in 14% − 25% of cases depending on the dataset. In Pohast et al.’s manual sensibility evaluation, the
obfuscated text received a grade of 2/5 on a scale from 1 (excellent) to 5 (fail), mainly due to punctuation errors. In a
furthermanual evaluation of similarity to the original text on a three-point scale of “incorrect”, “passable” and “correct”,
all obfuscated texts were graded as “correct” or “passable”.
In the same PAN 2016 Author Masking Task, Mihaylova et al. applied various alterations by replacing elements
with others, merging, spliing, removal etc. [116]. In Pohast et al.’s evaluation [135], Mihaylova et al. received
the best results of all PAN 2016 Author Masking Task contenders in safety (i.e. the success of obfuscation), with
an average impact of 36 % – 49 % depending on the dataset. However, in the manual evaluation of sensibility and
soundness, the obfuscated texts were deemed practically unreadable and semantically odd. In a subsequent study, the
same authors applied similar but improved techniques to the same test seing, shiing stylistic features toward their
average distribution in the training set [79]. Using multiple author identificationmethods from prior PAN competitions,
their method achieved an average accuracy drop between 10% and 16%, andmaintained a superior readability compared
to their prior method.
In terms of retaining the original meaning, rule-based substitution is a more secure obfuscation method than ILT, as
it allows deterministic user control of the output. Especially with grammatical changes, transformations can be limited
to have only minor semantic impact. However, the scalability of hand-craed rules across a large variety of datasets
is difficult to aain [157]. With lexical replacements semantic retention is harder to control, as the appropriateness of
paraphrases can be highly context-dependent. If WordNet is used for synonym replacement, context effects can partly
be accounted for by using sense disambiguation techniques, such as the Lesk algorithm [96, 140]. WordNet represents
words in the uninflected lemma format, which restricts synonym replacement to contexts where the surface form is
identical with the lemma. e Paraphrase Database (PPDB) [55] is themajor alternative toWordNet, and links inflected
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forms directly. Derived from parallel corpora used for MT, PPDB also involves information about the appropriate
syntactic environment for the paraphrases. However, since the phrases are represented as raw text, it does not directly
allow the use of Lesk or other semantic sense disambiguation algorithms.
MT between styles In addition to translating across different languages, MT can be used within the same language to
automatically paraphrase text. Importantly, such a method could allow not only obfuscation of the original author but
automatic imitation of a predetermined style. MTwas used for style transformation byXu et al. [176], who paraphrased
Shakespeare as modern English and evaluated the results both manually and with three automatic methods based on
cosine similarity (n-gram overlap), language models with Bayesian probability estimation, and logistic regression. e
automatic metrics correlated with human judgement to a significant degree.
In addition to using ILT for obfuscation (see above), Day et al. [36] applied iterative paraphrasing, creating the
paraphrase dataset with the online tool Plagiarisma. Paraphrasing decreased the author identification ratewith Hybrid-
II [105] from 54% to 7% in the first iteration, 1%with the second iteration, and 6%with the third iteration. e LSA-value
for paraphrased text was 0.80, indicating relatively high lexical overlap with the original text. Like the MT algorithms,
paraphrasing itself was detectable, with fingerprinting accuracies of 86% on the first iteration, 91% on the second
iteration, and 95% on the third iteration.
More recently, neural machine translation (NMT) techniques [103, 171] have been adopted for automatic style im-
itation. e input is first mapped to a style-neutral representation, and then a new sentence is generated from this
representation while controlling target style. However, the transformations implemented in these studies have oen
involved semantic changes, as in altering sentiment or political slant [69, 136, 156]. In contrast, the main goal of adver-
sarial stylometry is to retain semantic content to a maximal extent while fooling the author classifier. is is evidently
not achieved with examples like Prabhumoye et al.’s political slant transformation from “i thank you, sen. visclosky”
to “i’m praying for you sir” [136]. Such examples may deceive a Democrat-Republican classifier, but they also change
the original meaning too much to constitute viable forms of transformation for anonymization purposes. Since we
are concerned with adversarial stylometry and not content alteration, we do not review research on the laer. An
important aspect of future work is a more systematic application of the suggested methods to different kinds of tasks,
with a particular focus on their ability to retain content across stylistic changes.
In addition to experimenting on political slant and sentiment, Prabhumoye et al. [136] also tackle the issue of
gender profiling, which falls under our scope by being a purely author-related, non-semantic feature. e basis for
their method is the notion that translation to another language will remove many style-specific features [137]. First,
they train translators between English and French to both directions, and begin the style transformation process by
translating the original sentence to French. ey then process the French translation with the encoder part of the
French-to-English translator. e decoder part of the translator is a generative model that takes the French encoding
as a context vector and produces an English target sentence. ey split this decoder into different variants, which
are trained to produce sentences allocated to particular categories by a CNN classifier. e resulting sentences are
thus the combined effect of the original French-English translator and the class-based tuning of the English decoder.
Prabhumoye et al. compare their back-translation method with Shen et al.’s [156] cross-aligned autoencoder approach,
which is similar but uses a different algorithm for generating the intermediate style-neutral representation. e gender
classifier’s original accuracy of 82%was reduced to 40%with cross-aligned autoencoders and 43%with back-translation.
In a manual fluency evaluation on 60 random sentences, gender imitation by cross-aligned autoencoders received an
average rating of 2.42/4, while imitation by back-translation received 2.81/4.
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Shey et al. [157] present a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) -based approach to style transformation, which
they title Adversarial Author Aribute Anonymity Neural Translation (A4NT). A GAN consists of a classifier trained to
discriminate between two or more classes, and a generative model that is trained to fool this classifier [59]. A4NT is an
unsupervised approach where an encoder-decoder network is trained to generate sentences which fool a word-based
LSTM author classifier, but also maintain a maximal semantic proximity to the original sentence. Semantic retention
was measured as a combination of two components: the probability of reconstructing the original sentence via a
reverse A4NT-transformation, and the distance of sentence embeddings constructed using a pre-trained embedding
model [30]. A4NT was tested across three classification tasks: blog author gender, blog author age, and political
speeches by Barack Obama vs. Donald Trump. In all tasks, the method lowered classification accuracy to random
chance or below. However, these results only concerned the same classifier as used in training the GAN. Shey et al.
further show that blog age classification F1-score is dropped from 87% to 62% with the best of 10 alternative classifier
candidates. Corresponding results from the two other tasks are not shown. For assessing semantic similarity, they use
theMTevaluationmetricMeteor [38], whichmeasures n-gram overlap using additional paraphrase tables. ey receive
scores of 0.69, 0.79, and 0.29 in the gender, age, and Obama/Trump tasks, respectively. Shey et al. note that these
results exceed those received with automatic paraphrasing methods [99], although such comparison is problematic as
the studies involve different corpora. Finally, a user-study indicated that human evaluators preferred A4NT to ILT via
Google Translate with a similar obfuscation success.
Of the approaches reviewed here, only A4NT has a built-in mechanism for semantic retainment. In spite of this,
even its example transformations oen include drastic semantic changes, as seen in the following Obama-Trump trans-
formations taken from Shey et al. [157]:
“their situation is geing worse.” → “their media is geing worse.”
“(…) because i do care”→ “(…) because they don’t care.”
“that’s how our democracy works.” → “that’s how our horrible horrible trade deals.”
A system that cannot secure sufficient semantic retention is unreliable for real-life application, irrespective of its
success in fooling author identification. Overall, recent advances in NMT and GANs show promise in generating
stylistic transformations, but further research is required to evaluate the feasibility of such methods in more realistic
scenarios against a large variety of classifiers. Beyond adversarial stylometry, the transformation of writing style
has been studied within automatic text simplification [120, 158, 159, 173], which in turn belongs to the broader field
of paraphrase generation [99, 106]. Effects of these methods on author obfuscation have yet to be investigated, but
increasing the interaction between these fields would likely be beneficial to both sides.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Section 1 presented the following three questions concerning deception detection based on writing style:
Q1 Does deception leave a content-independent stylistic trace?
Q2 Is the deanonymization aack a realistic privacy concern?
Q3 Can the deanonymization aack be mitigated with automatic style obfuscation?
Based on the literature review conducted in Section 2, Q1 was answered negatively. We demonstrated that linguistic
features that have correlated with deception have been too specific to particular semantic domains to constitute gen-
uine stylistic “deception markers”. e practical consequence of this finding is that stylometric analysis has plausible
utility for deception detection only if the training and test domain are sufficiently similar. Furthermore, even when
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successful, stylistic markers of deception are likely to be content-based correlates rather than indicators of general
psychological mechanisms behind lying.
Our review suggest that alternative approaches to pure stylometry are likely more effective in detecting textual
deception. ese include, in particular, content comparison, similarity detection, and using metadata. Content compari-
son allows detecting texts that contain claims with a pre-established truth-value based on an external knowledge base
[147]. False claims are not deceptive if they are sincerely believed (see Section 2), but a strong correlation between
falsity and deception is nevertheless likely. Surface-level similarity between texts has also proven helpful in finding
trolls or spammers, who tend to repeat the same across many discussions [94, 122, 167]. Finally, information beyond
linguistic content has been more effective in detecting fake reviews [119, 144] or trolls [115] than linguistic content.
Stylometric classification can assist such techniques, but is severely limited as a stand-alone solution.
With respect to Q2, we argued that stylometry-based deanonymization constitutes a realistic privacy threat, espe-
cially if the set of potential authors is small (ca. ≤ 20) [4, 14, 15, 183]. Even though author identification has not proven
sufficiently scalable to larger sets of authors (ca. > 1000) [123], stylometry can still significantly increase the likeli-
hood of finding the correct author, even among 100000 candidates [121]. From the perspective of an author wishing
to retain anonymity, these results are legitimately worrying. With the constant increase in the availability of corpora
and computing power, the deanonymization aack will likely continue to be a growing privacy threat. We therefore
consider the further development of automatic style obfuscation tools as not merely an academic excercise, but to have
important real-life consequences for information security.
Turning to Q3, manual obfuscation remains potentially effective against the deanonymization aack [4, 14, 15],
and tools like Anonymouth [109] can help in this task. Fully automatic approaches, in contrast, suffer from the dif-
ficulty of balancing sufficient obfuscation success with semantic faithfulness to the original text. So far, only simple
rule-based approaches have allowed securing semantic retention, as transformations can be limited to semantically
vacuous choices [79, 82]. However, these methods are very limited in application, and have not demonstrated suffi-
cient obfuscation success. Only one of all the studies reviewed in Section 3.3.3 included a semantic similarity measure
in the algorithm [157], and even it had trouble with too severe semantic alterations. Approaches have largely relied
on a priori assumptions about ILT or paraphrase replacement not altering semantics, which has not been sufficiently
confirmed. Additionally, while user studies are important for assessing readability and semantic retention, the lack
of established baselines makes the results difficult to evaluate. Merely comparative measures between different tech-
niques are also inadequate, as they do not demonstrate whether the transformations are acceptable, but only which
are preferred under an obligatory choice.
e detectability of obfuscationmethods themselves has not been sufficiently investigated, as only two of the studies
we reviewed had conducted such an evaluation [22, 36]. All ILT variants could be detected with a high accuracy
in both studies, including even the number of intermediate languages. Day et al. also successfully fingerprinted a
paraphrase-based MT-algorithm [36]. ese results indicate that even if obfuscation succeeds, obfuscated texts could
still be distinguished from original texts. However, it bears emphasis that such classification requires knowledge of
the obfuscation algorithm, which may not be available. e general property of being obfuscated with any method is
unlikely to leave a stylistic trace. e situation is similar to the case of automatically generated fake reviews (Section
2.2.1), where the detection of generated text is possible, but only provided that the generation algorithm is known
[77, 178].
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Summarizing our discussion on adversarial stylometry, while promising frameworks for automatic text transfor-
mation exist especially within NMT, securing semantic retention has not been sufficiently studied or implemented in
state-of-the-art style transformation applications. We believe that this constitutes the most important challenge for the
field going forward. We further suggest that increased interaction between different fields would likely prove useful.
While we have focused on style transformation from the perspective of information security, the field of automatic para-
phrasing is much broader in scope [99, 106], involving tasks such as automatic text simplification [120, 158, 159, 173],
controlling for style in MT [155], politeness transformation [143], or generating exercises for language pedagogy [8].
Systematically examining the effects of methods developed for other purposes on style obfuscation would constitute
a valuable addition to the field.
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